This book is a synthesis of information gathered through observation, discussion, investigation and experience over the last ten years.

I cannot entirely vouch for its authenticity. Disclosure of the sources from which it is drawn would undoubtedly lead to great difficulties for them. And in matters of this kind the Soviet is not accustomed to the issuance of validations…

In a rare moment of candour in late August 2004, United States President George W Bush confessed to the American public and the world at large that he and his administration had “miscalculated” the disastrous consequences of invading Iraq.

Bush could not say for sure “what went wrong”, preferring instead to leave that “for the historians to decide.” He somehow managed to overlook the fact that his administration had already placed a 25 years embargo on much of the official documentation upon which “the historians” would need to rely.

The politics of history and the integration of history into political transformation are therefore unlikely to receive any immediate boost from Bush’s new-found openness. It is hoped, in the mean time, that Between the Lies might go some way towards filling in some of the existing, historical gaps. Nor is Bush’s belated show of honesty likely to change an already prevalent view among large numbers of people that they were duped by what the British and American governments had told them about the “war against terrorism” and about “weapons of mass destruction hidden in Iraq”. In fact, many people today no longer believe much of what those governments
say about anything else. Yet, while this public mood of disenchantment with politics and politicians may be a comparatively recent phenomenon, the military-political lies and deceptions that caused it are not something new, or something that arrived fully fledged and out of the blue. The official fabrications that “justified” the United States-led invasion of Iraq were but the most recent manifestation in a long continuum, namely the battle for public opinion in time of war.

Today’s official lies, as the following pages will show, seem almost benign when compared with, among other things, some of the secret propaganda operations hatched during World War II by Winston Churchill, and propagated by subservient mass media.

The pages that follow also provide a critical reassessment of prevailing heroic notions and enduring myths about what the military and political leadership of the West ostensibly intended and did actually achieve during some of the major military operations of the 20th Century, culminating in today’s much vaunted “war on terrorism”. If there is a lesson to be learned from all this, it is that the generally accepted outcomes of World War II and the Cold War, in particular, are wrongly perceived as a triumph of the “forces of good” over the “forces of darkness”.

The modern world is at least better understood as having emerged as the result of hidden factors that were neither wanted nor anticipated by those who made the ultimate sacrifices.

Why did the United States go to war in Iraq—and what does it seek to accomplish there?

This study argues that the George W. Bush administration charted the
correct strategy in Iraq, but has failed to match its military means to
its strategic ends.


Why did the United States go to war in Iraq—and what does it seek to accomplish there? This is the question that veteran defense analyst and AEI resident fellow Thomas Donnelly seeks to answer in his study of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Looking past the prewar debate in the UN Security Council and postwar recriminations over weapons of mass destruction, Donnelly argues that the Bush administration charted the correct strategy in Iraq, but has failed to match its military means to its strategic ends.

Donnelly traces the origins of the Iraq war over the past quarter century to the collapsing political order in the Middle East and President Bush’s fundamental belief, following the September 11 attacks, that America will not be safe until the Middle East is free. Drawing on firsthand research in postwar Iraq, Donnelly argues that military planning did not fully reflect the administration抯 policy, with the Pentagon抯 desire to fight a quick war ultimately undercutting its ability to fight a decisive war.

The global war on terror is a marathon, Donnelly argues, but the United States has a military—indeed, an entire national security bureaucracy—built for sprints. The question now is whether America will transform itself for the long, hard fight ahead, or pursue a more limited victory. Donnelly believes the latter is simply a euphemism for defeat.

Deftly separating truth from propaganda, Target Iraq is a hard-hitting expose of the harsh realities and consequences of the pending war and the media’s failure to present the full spectrum of issues to the public. Target Iraq will figure prominently in the national debate about the war against Iraq. Included are appendices by the Institute for Public Accuracy and FAIR — Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting  — that provide a line-by line analysis of Bush’s key October speech to Congress, the UN Security Council resolution, and other related speeches and documents.

There’s a lot of new information in this well-written examination by CNN’s terrorism expert on the man believed to be behind the events of September 11, though some of its revelations have already been reported elsewhere in the media. What distinguishes this account is its depth: Bergen has long tracked the Islamic world the book opens with the account of his 1997 interview with bin Laden, the terrorist’s first TV interview and it shows. He sheds light on several outstanding questions, arguing, among other things, that it’s unlikely Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks, and that it’s a myth that the CIA directly funded and trained bin Laden during the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. According to Bergen, the CIA gave its money to Pakistan and then let that country’s intelligence agency decide what to do with it, which was to fund those they viewed as the most strictly Islamic groups among those opposing the Soviet Union. He also adds some details about bin Laden’s rise from his wealthy childhood in Saudi Arabia to his current career, and the global spread of Al Qaeda’s terrorizing tentacles. The information on what is known about September 11 added hurriedly after the original manuscript was completed, as Bergen admits gives the book a slightly jagged feel. But those looking for a balanced, comprehensive look at bin Laden and his crew as well as an answer to the now preeminent question “why do they hate us so much?” will do well to start here. (Nov. 13)Forecast: Given the piling up of books about bin Laden, etc., on bestseller lists, it’s a foregone conclusion that this will join them, with first serial to Vanity Fair and selection by the major book clubs.

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